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Descartes thought his mind and body could exist apart, and that this attested 
to a real distinction between them. The challenge as Almog initially describes 
it is to find a reading of “can exist apart” that is strong enough to establish a 
real distinction, yet weak enough to be justified by what Descartes offers as 
evidence: that DM (his mind) and DB (his body) can be conceived apart. ’ 
Descartes is caught in a dilemma. The “prove too little” horn has him 
claiming only the separability in thought of DM and DB. This is epistemo- 
logically too little because it says nothing about DM and DB’s relations out- 
side the intellect, not even that DM # DB. It is metaphysically too little 
because DM and DB are more than non-identical; they are “distinct, complete, 
subjects, each of which can exist without the other” (xviii). 
The “prove too much” horn has Descartes advocating the modal conclu- 
sion that there is a real possibility of DM existing without DB. Such a con- 
clusion is epistemologically too much because it outruns Descartes’s evi- 
dence. It is metaphysically too much because we run the risk of being “so 
successful at separating mind and body that when we put them together again, 
we no longer get a real, natural unity” (xviii). 
So: “DM and DB can exist apart” must assert more than cognitive separa- 
bility, but less than modal separability. It may seem no space is left for a 
third option, but Almog offers to find space. 
Not all of the properties necessary to a thing x pertain to what x is .  Even 
if DM and DB exist in the same worlds, there need be nothing in either’s 
nature-in what it is-to require accompaniment by the other. This lack of 
requirement manifests itself in the existence of coherent stories, respectful of 
what DM and DB are, featuring one of the two without the other. It is in the 
stories that DM and DB realize their potential to exist apart. DM and DB are 
“by nature” or “constitutively” separable items that necessarily coexist. 
Now, the beauty of constitutive separability is supposed to lie in its 
avoidance of the too mucWtoo little dilemma; so it is important that cruder 
forms of separability really do fall to this dilemma in a way Almog’s pre- 
ferred alternative does not. It is important in other words that 
’ This note confines itself to the “separatist” stage of Almog’s “two-stage Cartesian con- 
ception of man” (59). ignoring his later denial even of separability in a story. 
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(U-) Modal separability makes the man a “mere unity of composition.” 
(U+) Constitutive separability allows him to be a “natural unity.” 
(E-) Descartes has no good evidence for modal separability. 
(E+) Descartes has better evidence for constitutive separability. 
(R-) Cognitive separability cannot establish a real distinction. 
(R+) Constitutive separability does establish a real distinction. 
These claims do seem to be ones to which Almog is prima facie attracted, but 
he says suprisingly little in their defense. This note tries to needle him into 
saying more. For discussion purposes we can lump (U-) with (U+), (E-) with 
(R-), and (E+) with (R+). 
NATURAL UNITY [(U-) and (U+)] 
Almog says that anyone hoping to integrate “DM and DB in a single 
man-would find such a real possibility [of DM without DB] to be too 
much, too strong, a premise” (25-6). Why does he think a “mere unity of 
composition” is the best modally separable items can hope for?* Why should 
their possible separation put limits on DM’s actual unity with DB? 
A helpful reference point here is the unity of a statue GS of Goliath with 
the mass of atoms GA of which it is made. There would no ground for com- 
plaint about Descartes coming out a “mere unity of composition” if DM and 
DB were as tightly integrated as GS and GA. Yet this is a case of modal sepa- 
rability. GS would have existed without GA had a certain atom desayed 
slightly earlier, so that GS had to be made out of GA- instead. GA would 
have existed without GS had the order been for a statue of Hercules rather 
than Goliath. 
Modal separability need not drive its relata so far apart as to preclude an 
intimate unity between them. However DM is possible not only without DB, 
but without any bodies. This is certainly a disanalogy with the statue case, 
but its implications are unclear. One would have to show that y’s  potential to 
exist without anything x-ish prevents y from being in this world naturally 
unified with x - o r  hence, presumably, composed of x. 
Does it? A recent analysis of composition3 says that x composes y in a 
world iff the following three conditions hold there: 
( la) x and y have the same parts: 
2 
3 
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Oddly, a unity of composition in some sense of the phrase appears to be just what Des- 
cartes had in mind: “the thing that understands and the thing that wills are one and the 
same in virtue of a unity of nature ...[ when mind and body] are said to be ‘one and the 
same’ is this not rather in respect of unity of composition, insofar as they are found in the 
same man, just as bones and flesh are found in the same animal?” (CSM 11, 286). 
Thomson, “The Statue and the Clay,” Noris (1997). 
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( 1  b) any part essential to y has a part essential to x, 
(lc) not every part essential to x has a part essential to y. 
The theory says that x composes y in w only if y has in w teeny-tiny parts 
essential only to x. There is no requirement that y must continue in other 
worlds to have parts essential only to x. It is not even required that x-like 
items exist in other worlds; perhaps then level of reality just drops away. 
I do not say that this is clearly the right result, but it is not clearly the 
wrong result either. This doughnut is made of quarks. It might be that quarks 
are made in turn of quirks. If so, then the doughnut is made of quirks as well. 
But it seems at least an open question whether a world bottoming out at the 
quark level must therefore omit the doughnut. Similarly it seems an open 
question whether DM’s having a material constitution in this world means 
that DM cannot persist into worlds where the material level goes missing. 
Perhaps we should be asking, not how modal separability hurts the “dual 
key project,” but how modal inseparability-existing in the same possible 
worlds-helps. Various principles suggest themselves. 
(2a) if x and y necessarily coexist, then x is naturally unified with y. 
(2b) if n and y necessarily coexist and each pertains to what the other is, 
then x is naturally unified with y. 
(2c) if x and y necessarily coexist and what each is requires it to be natu- 
rally unified with the other, then x is naturally unified with y. 
But (2a) is not plausible. Abstract objects exist in the same worlds, but a 
compound of, say, 71: with quadruplucity would be artificial in the extreme. 
As for (2b), North and South Dakota exist in the same worlds, and each per- 
tains to what the other is; DM and DB presumably aspire to a higher degree 
of unity than that. (2c) is correct but no thanks to modal inseparability, since 
the consequent would still follow if the antecedent were weakened to “what x 
is requires it to be naturally unified with y,” or even “it just so happens that x 
is naturally unified with y.” 
MODAL SEPARABILITY [(E-), (R-)I 
It is clear what Descartes thinks his evidence is: DM is conceivable without 
DB. Since modal separability amounts in this case to the possibility of DM 
without DB, Almog must think that the conceivability of DM without DB 
provides no evidence for the corresponding possibility. He reaches this con- 
clusion as follows. Either we follow Amauld and write possibility into the 
“Part” is intended in a spatiotemporal, not an Aristotelian, sense. 
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definition of conceivability-one only seems to conceive the impossible-or 
we follow Descartes in writing only the (perhaps misleading) appearance of 
possibility into the definition. Arnauldian conceivability-conceivability,- 
is no use, because to know one is really conceiving, p one must first know 
that p is possible (which was to be shown). Cartesian conceivability- 
conceivabilityc-is no use because it establishes at best seeming possibility. 
The objection to conceivability, can be put like this. Suppose that A is a 
feature of propositions. A propositional act or attitude is A-jactive iff no one 
counts as +ing that p unless p is A. Realizing that p is in these terms truth- 
factive; refuting p is falsity-factive; conceiving, that p is possibility-factive. 
The principle Almog seems to be relying on is 
(3) If 0-ing is A-factive, then @-ing that p provides no basis for the 
conclusion that p is A. 
But why should we accept (3)? I know that Sally is asleep because I see that 
she is asleep. It would be silly to object that whether I do indeed see this 
remains an open question until someone shows she is not faking. Or suppose 
$-ing that p is proving that p .  It would be silly to object that “here is a proof 
that p ,  therefore p” begs the question since it is not really a proof unless p is 
true. A principle that casts as much doubt on the evidential value of seeing 
and proving as it does on conceiving, can in non-skeptical contexts be safely 
ignored. 
It might be thought that the real evidence in these cases is my seeming to 
see or prove that p ,  or my seeming to find p conceivable, (which corresponds 
more or less to finding it conceivable,). This brings us to the second worry: 
conceivability, establishes only seeming possibility, not real possibility. 
This is true if “establishes” means “establishes beyond any possible doubt, 
however nutty or hyperbolic.” But of course, seeming to see that p does not 
in that sense “establish” p either. If the problem with conceivability evidence 
is that it is as bad as the evidence of the senses, that is a problem we can 
learn to live with. It should be enough for us if conceivability evidence does 
or can establish possibility beyond any reasonable doubt. 
A reasonable doubt might seem to be just what Arnauld is offering, when 
he challenges Descartes to distinguish himself from a geometer who has “not 
yet.. .grasped for certain” that a right-angled triangle has the Pythagorean 
property (A2 + B2 = C2); perhaps he even hypothesizes that 
(4) A 2  + B2 f C2. 
The geometer can “confirm” his mistaken hypothesis (4) as follows: 
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(5) ‘I clearly and distinctly perceive.. .that the triangle is right-angled; 
but I doubt that [A2 + B2 = C’]; therefore it does not belong to the 
essence of the triangle that [A2 + B2 = C2]’ (CSM 11, 142). 
So far the conclusion is only that (4) is possible; but that is enough if the 
geometer appreciates that 
(6) the actual ratio of A2 + B2 to C2 holds necessarily. 
Using his incomplete understanding of the triangle as a basis for modal infer- 
ence thus leads the geometer into error. And how, Arnauld asks, “is my per- 
ception of the nature of my mind any clearer than his perception of the nature 
of the triangle?’ (CSM 11, 142). 
Descartes responds by listing some disanalogies between the geometer’s 
situation and his own; but commentators (Almog included) have had trouble 
connecting these disanalogies to the issue at hand, viz. whose intuition is 
more to be trusted. So a case can be made that Arnauld has indeed uncovered a 
non-hyperbolic reason for doubt. But a case can also be made that at least one 
of Descartes’s disanalogies is not irrelevant. Descartes writes that 
(7) It is not possible to have a concept of the triangle such that no ratio 
at all is understood to hold between the square on the hypotenuse and 
the squares on the other two sides (CSM 11, 158). 
This suggests that insofar as the geometer thinks that 1 might turn out not to 
be the ratio of (A2 + B2) to C2, he thinks of other numbers r that the ratio 
might turn out to be r .  Now suppose for reductio that 
(8) whatever the geometer thinks “might turn out” to be the case seems 
to him genuinely possible. 
Then it must seem that the ratio of (A2 + B2) to C2 is in some worlds 1, and 
in others r .  But if the ratio varies across worlds, then no ratio “belong[s] to 
the essence of the triangle.” By (6),  the actual ratio, if there were one, would 
belong to the essence; so our geometer can only conclude that there is no 
actual ratio. But then by (7), our geometer lacks the concept of a triangle! 
This is absurd, so our reductio assumption (8) must be mistaken. That our 
geometer allows that (A2 + B2) might not be C2 does not mean this strikes 
him as genuinely possible. Since it does strike Descartes as possible that 
DM should exist without DB, it is hard to see why Descartes should worry 
that he is under the same modal illusion as the geometer. Such a worry would 
be doubly silly, since on the one hand, 
(9) the geometer is not under a modal illusion, for he is not under a 
modal impression; nothing presents itself as possible, 
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and on the other, 
(10)Descartes has a kind of evidence that the geometer lacks, viz. the 
seeming possibility (the conceivability,) of DM without DB. 
So Descartes has been given no reason whatever to mistrust his intuition that 
DM could exist without DB, or without bodies. All Arnauld has to offer is 
the abstract possibility that the intuition is wrong. 
Arnauld is not the only philosopher Almog enlists against Cartesian con- 
ceivability arguments. The other is Kripke, and their views are seen as 
closely related. Each holds that de re modal illusions arise because one con- 
ceives x too unspecifically; one lacks a proper “conceptual fix” on x. They 
differ, though, in their theories of conceptual fix. Arnauld thinks the illusion 
that x could have been F arises because one’s idea of x leaves out that to be F 
is impossible for x. One guards against this by arranging that 
(1 1) all properties necessary for being x are included in one’s idea of x. 
Kripke thinks the illusion arises because one’s idea of x is impoverished in a 
complementary way: the properties it includes are too few to ensure that one 
is really thinking of x, as opposed to some x* that is picked out the same 
way. Intuitions about n are not to be trusted unless 
(12) the properties included in one’s idea of x are sufficient for being x 
Suppose we call x fathomable if (11) holds and inimitable if (12) holds. 
Then Descartes’s intuition is worthless by Amadd’s standards because minds 
fail the fathomability test; in particular we cannot rule out that it is 
not merely actually true that my mind is connected to a (this) body but also that of necessity it is 
so connected (20). 
Descartes’s intuition is (supposedly) worthless by Kripke’s standards because 
while pain may be inimitable, thoughts and minds are not. Consider Castor’s 
thought that H 2 0  is wet and Pollux’s thought that XYZ is wet; “[tlhe phe- 
nomenological description is very much the same” (58). And 
If the mental states of such subjects are not exhausted by their phenomenological character, it 
may be argued that the subjects that bear those states do not have their identity so exhausted 
(55). 
Amadd’s objection from unfathomability is well known, so let me not dis- 
cuss it here? But the objection Almog finds in Kripke is new, both in itself 
and as an interpretation of Kripke. 
’ See above and “The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body;’ Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, supp. vol. 16 (1990). 149-201. 
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It ought to strike us as odd that Kripke shows no particular qualms about 
the intuitions he is said to have proved worthless. Cartesian methods can in 
his view “establish that a statue is not the hunk of stone, or the congery of 
molecules, of which it is composed,” even though a counterpart of the statue 
would present itself the same way.6 He takes our intuition that Nixon could 
have been a baker at face value, never worrying for a moment that the possi- 
ble baker is instead Nixon*. (We “are speaking of Nixon, and asking 
what ... would have been true of him.”7) Intuitions about the self are treated 
similarly: “I could have been in the same epistemological situation in rela- 
tion to a lectern made of ice as I actually am in relation to this lectern.”* 
Almog’s Kripke would not be so bold. Who is to say that it was not Kripke* 
being taken in by that icy lectern? 
Almog appreciates that his interpretation (“nothing external is quite what 
it seems” (52)) makes Kripke more of a modal skeptic than he professes to 
be. He puts the blame for this on Kripke, who has not followed through the 
implications of his own claims. But where does Kripke say that 
(13) modal intuitions about x cannot be trusted unless x is inimitable, 
that is, nothing else presents the same way. 
He claims only that 
(14) modal intuitions about n cannot be dismissed (the way we dismiss 
the intuition of light without photons) unless x is imitable. 
This (plus the inimitability of pain) is all Kripke needs to counter the scien- 
tific materialist’s insistence that light = a stream ofphotons can serve as a 
model for pain = c9berfirings. 
CONSTITUTIVE SEPARABILITY [(E+), (R+)] 
The proposition x is F is possible iff it is consistent with what x is to be F, 
and necessary iff it is inconsistent with what x is not to be F. Almog sug- 
gests (62) that conceivability might be a better guide to possibility, in some 
cases, than to possibility. That would presumably be because n is (in cases of 
interest) less fathomable than fathomable-in the sense that 
(1 1) all properties necessary to x are included in our idea of x 
and less inimitable than inimitable-in the sense that 
Kripke, “Identity & Necessity,” p. 101, fn 19 
Ibid, p. 93, fn 15. 
’ Ibid., p. 81. 
8 
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(12) it is not possible for anything other than x to have the properties in 
our idea of x. 
One expects to find, then, that DM has prima facie a better shot at satisfying 
(11) and (12) than (11) and (12). 
I am not sure that we do find this. We have Almog’s own word for it that 
(12) fails in the same way as (12). When we seem to conceive DM without 
bodies, 
. . .  we have not ... really conceived of this subject that it is this way because its being this way 
flouts what this subject is (105). 
What we really conceive is the existence of a thinking being (note the italicized indefinite 
article) without any extended object in the story.. . (106).  
So any advantage must be on the score of (11). Alrnog does seem to think 
that DM is more fathomable than fathomable: 
Science may divulge to us various truths about both mind and body, perhaps necessary truths. 
But our basic conception of what each one of us is is not threatened by future chemical dis- 
coveries (40). 
But Almog does not explain why our views on DM’s essence should be more 
subject to correction by science than our views on DM’s essence. The one 
passage he cites has Descartes mocking Gassendi for “want[ing] us.. . ‘to con- 
duct a kind of chemical investigation’ of the mind, as we would of wine” 
(CSM 11, 248-9). But this passage makes no invidious comparison of the 
kind Almog needs; Descartes might just as well be denying that science can 
embarrass his intuitions about DM’s (regular old) essence. I do not know 
how Almog would try to convince Descartes that his essence is more a matter 
for empirical investigation than his e~sence .~  
I wish Almog had said more about how he knows that Descartes is underestimating his 
essence. He hints at an argument from externalism about content (54-8), but that would 
be a case of blindsiding by philosophy, not science. He may think that no argument is 
required: “I, for one, would rather assume this at the outset and bar claims of the genuine 
possibility of the disembodied existence of DM” (39). 
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